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In Faint Praise of the Derogating Will:   
The UK, ECHR derogation, and Smith v. MOD1 
Elizabeth Chadwick and Katja Samuel* 
 
Social peace is a two-sided affair.  Ultimately our societies  
depend on shared bonds and mutual understanding.  
From time to time, voices do speak in terms  
which are not helpful to the rule of law.2 
 
1. Introduction 
Reducing the country’s human rights obligations has been officially mooted by 
various UK governments over the years.  Although legislative change is not 
considered to be imminent,3 a flavour of the rising irritation at human rights 
obligations, voiced in official British circles, is easily located within the most 
contentious environment for human rights law in Britain:  the extra-territorial 
effect and application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
and most particularly, of ECHR applicability during Council of Europe Member 
State deployments of their armed forces overseas.  This development has 
become especially contentious in Britain in recent years, due to the fairly-
frequent deployment of its armed forces overseas, not least in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.4  Therefore, this short discussion seeks to overview some of the legal 
                                                          
* Reader in Law, Nottingham Trent University, and Associate Professor, Reading University, 
respectively. 
1 [2013] UKSC 41, on appeal from [2011] EWHC 1678 QB; [2012] EWCA Civ 1365. 
2 Owen Boycott, ‘British Supreme Court Justice makes veiled attack on Donald Trump’ The 
Guardian (London, 8 March 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/mar/08/british-
supreme-court-justice-makes-veiled-attack-on-donald-trump> accessed 21 May 2017 (quoting 
Lord Mance, ‘Speech’, the Bahamas, February, 2017). 
3 Rebecca Hacker, ‘Minister Confirms Indefinite Delay In Plans to Replace Human Rights Act’ 
(RightsInfo, 25 January 2017) <http://rightsinfo.org/plans-replace-human-rights-act-put-
hold/?utm_source=Weekly+Updates&utm_campaign=a25f304044-
Weekly_Newsletter_Test4_22_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_5de50f2649-
a25f304044-115312793> accessed 21 May 2017.  See, eg, Conservative Party, ‘Protecting 
Human Rights in the UK:  The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights 
Laws’, September 2014 <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1308660/protecting-
human-rights-in-the-uk.txt> accessed 21 May 2017.  
4 See Christian Tomuschat, ‘Human rights and international humanitarian law’ [2010] 21(1) 
EJIL 15, 16 (the most fundamental of all human rights is the individual's right to life).  In 
agreement, Bugdaycay v. SOS Home Department [1987] Parliamentary Archives, 
implications of human rights legislative change in a post-EU, or ‘Brexit’, UK,5 
in which EU- and ECHR-related human rights obligations may both disappear 
or be greatly diminished. 
On the basis of official British irritation at human rights, it may come as little 
surprise to some that, in what was potentially a first step towards eventual 
legislative change to current standards of substantive human rights coverage, 
the then Conservative Party-led government, on 4 October 2016, expressly 
declared its intention to derogate in future overseas deployments and 
operations from its human rights commitments to British military personnel, ‘if 
possible, in the circumstances that exist at that time’.6  The then government’s 
two main rationales were linked:  the military should not be unduly hampered 
by fear of litigation, in general, when planning military operations and 
deploying its personnel overseas, and the government should not be exposed, 
in particular, to ‘vexatious’ human rights litigation in such a context, which 
has in fact occurred during recent deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
which has been highly-expensive.  To clarify the latter point, military-linked 
litigation has arisen during recent deployments overseas of British forces, and 
has been generated either by the death or injury of British military personnel 
themselves, or by the death or injury of persons whom British personnel have 
detained and/or imprisoned.     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
HL/PO/JU/18/247, 13, <http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/1986/3.html&query=bugdaycay&method=boolean> 
accessed 21 May 2017. 
5 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), The human rights implications of 
Brexit:  Conclusions and recommendations, 16 December 2016 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/695/69502.htm> 
accessed 21 May 2017; Brexit Activities (ongoing), BIICL <http://www.biicl.org/brexit> accessed 
21 May 2017; Tobias Lock, ‘What does Brexit have to do with human rights?’, OUP blog, 13 
June 2016 <https://blog.oup.com/2016/06/brexit-human-rights-law/> accessed 21 May 
2017.   
6 News story, ‘Government to protect Armed Forces from persistent legal claims in future 
overseas operations’ (London, Ministry of Defence, 4 October 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-protect-armed-forces-from-persistent-
legal-claims-in-future-overseas-operations> accessed 21 May 2017; Peter Walker and Owen 
Boycott, ‘Plan for UK military to opt out of European convention on human rights’ The 
Guardian (London, 4 October 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/oct/03/plan-uk-military-opt-out-european-convention-human-rights> accessed 21 
May 2017.  In December 2015, the Defence Minister indicated a similar intention.  See, eg, 
Sam Grant, ‘The Government Wants to Limit Human Rights Of Soldiers.  Don’t They Deserve 
Protecting?’ (RightsInfo, 8 May 2016) <http://rightsinfo.org/government-wants-limit-human-
rights-soldiers-acting-abroad-dont-soldiers-families-deserve-protection/> accessed 21 May 
2017.   
The extra-territorial extension abroad of the ECHR is fairly recent,7 while, in 
contrast, securing the rights of serving British military personnel has developed 
only slowly, over many years, starting with the Crown Proceedings (Armed 
Forces) Act 1987, which statute finally allowed service personnel to sue the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) for negligence.8  Since then, a recognition, both in 
law and amongst the public, has grown that governmental responsibility for 
arbitrarily-inflicted death or injury of, or by,9 British military personnel, 
including when on active duty overseas, is in fact the proper subject of express 
rights obligations.  In turn, the ECHR, as a ‘living instrument’,10 is interpreted 
teleologically, such that its eventual, extra-territorial extension should not be 
overly-surprising.  Moreover, inasmuch as the English courts, since 1998, have 
had direct jurisdiction over claims arising under the ECHR brought in 
Britain,11 and that the UK has recently engaged in numerous military 
adventures overseas, it was always only a matter of time before ECHR 
applicability would gradually be extended by the Strasbourg Court (the 
European Court of Human Rights, or ECtHR) to include such operations.12  
                                                          
7 Including, inter alia, the territorial context utilised in Soering v. UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 [86]; 
the spatial model used in Bankovic v. Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435; and, the physical model 
used in R (Al-Skeini) v. SOS for Defence (2011) 53 EHRR 589.   
8 Matthews v. MOD [2003] UKHL 4 [7].  See Smith (No. 2) (n 1) [179] (Carnwath L citing HC Deb 
13 February 1987, vol 110, cols 567-609), regarding the same intent behind the Crown 
Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987 s 2(2), and the Reserve Forces Act 1980.  Today, the 
Armed Forces (Pension and Compensation) Act 2004 provides the military’s statutory no-fault 
compensation scheme. 
9 See, eg, Saxon Norgard, ‘Key Things You Need To Know About the Important New Iraq War 
Test Case’ (RightsInfo, 13 September 2016) <http://rightsinfo.org/five-things-need-know-new-
al-sadoon-judgment/?utm_source=Weekly+Updates&utm_campaign=30f12c5352-
Weekly_Newsletter_Test4_22_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_5de50f2649-
30f12c5352-115312793> accessed 21 May 2017 (overview of Al-Saadoon & Ors v The Secretary 
of State for Defence & Ors [2016] EWCA Civ 811, 9 September 2016).     
10 First noted by the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v UK App no 5856/72 (ECtHR, 
25 April 1978) Series A no 26.  See George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument:  Its 
Meaning and its Legitimacy’, SSRN, March 14, 2012, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021836 accessed 22 May 2017. 
11 Due to Parliamentary sovereignty, s 2 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) only requires UK courts 
to ‘take into account’ the rulings of the Strasbourg Court when they are interpreting ECHR 
rights, and s 3(1) HRA requires UK courts to read and give effect to UK legislation in a way 
which is compatible with Convention rights ‘so far as it is possible to do so’.  See, eg, Liberty, 
‘Briefing on Derogations and the Human Rights Act’, September 2016, <https://www.liberty-
human-
rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/campaigns/resources/Liberty%20Briefing%20on%20Derogati
ons%20and%20the%20Human%20Rights%20Act.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017; Daniel Charity, 
‘Supreme Court President:  UK Human Rights are not a “Power Grab” by Judges’ (RightsInfo, 
17 March 2017) <https://rightsinfo.org/supreme-court-human-rights-laws-judges/> accessed 
21 May 2017. 
12 Being acknowledged ‘exceptionally’ in Bankovic v. Belgium [2001] (n 7) [71], and on grounds 
of ‘physical and legal control’ in R (Al-Skeini) v. SOS for Defence [2011] (n 7) [137].  See Marko 
Milanovic, European Court Decides Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda’ (EJIL:  Talk!, 7 July 2011) 
Soon afterwards, the ECHR Article 2 ‘right to life’, specifically, of service 
personnel deployed on active duty overseas, was expressly acknowledged by 
Britain’s highest court - the UK Supreme Court - in 2013, in Smith & Ors. (No. 
2) v. Ministry of Defence No. 2.13   
The recently-announced ‘presumption to derogate’ is the Conservative Party-
led, UK government’s riposte,14 which, to an extent, reflects the deep unease 
also voiced in certain military and political circles, regarding the 
appropriateness of extending individual rights protections to, and in, 
dangerous, operational environments.  Lingering questions as to the proper 
balance, between Britain’s international human rights obligations, and its 
obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), during military 
deployments, make the matter even more complex.15  This short discussion 
thus critically considers the legal implications of the government’s future 
‘presumption to derogate’ in a post-EU, ‘Brexit UK,16 in which many existing 
human rights obligations are likely to be undermined, or even disappear.17  As 
such, it is speculated that the recent announcement of a ‘presumption to 
derogate’ in future is in fact designed to lay the groundwork for wider legislative 
change, including British withdrawal from the ECHR, and/or the repeal of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), as currently threatened,18 and to normalise 
reductions in rights coverage, in general.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-al-skeini-and-al-jedda/> accessed 21 May 
2017.  
13 (n 1). 
14 See, eg, Marko Milanovic, ‘UK to Derogate from the ECHR in Armed Conflict’ (EJIL:  Talk!, 5 
October 2016) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/uk-to-derogate-from-the-echr-in-armed-conflict/> 
accessed 21 May 2017. 
15 Specifically, IHL permits lawful killing, while the ECHR generally does not.  Regarding the 
interplay of the two legal regimes, see Nico Shrijver and Larissa van den Herik, ‘Leiden Policy 
Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law’, 1 April 2010, ss 1 - 2 [56] – 
[68] <http://www.uni-koeln.de/jur-
fak/kress/Materialien/Chef/HP882010/LeidenPolicyRecommendations1April2010.pdf> 
accessed 22 May 2017. 
16 See (n 5).   
17 See, eg, Angela Patrick, Mapping the Great Repeal:  European Union Law and the Protection of 
Human Rights, Thomas Paine Initiative Paper, October 2016, <http://www.ariadne-
network.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Mapping-the-Great-Repeal-Thomas-Paine-
Initiative-November-2016.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017; Tobias Lock, The EU and Human Rights, 
Royal Society of Edinburgh Briefing Paper, May 2016, 7, 
<https://www.rse.org.uk/cms/files/advice-
papers/2016/The%20EU%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017.   
18 Heather Stewart, ‘Ministers put British bill of rights plan on hold until after Brexit’, The 
Guardian (London, 29 December 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/dec/29/ministers-put-british-bill-of-rights-plan-
on-hold-until-after-brexit> accessed 22 May 2017 (Conservatives want to withdraw from the 
ECHR and to repeal the HRA). 
The structure of the discussion is as follows.  After a preliminary outline of 
what derogation entails, the government’s stated rationales for its ‘presumption 
to derogate’ in future are critically considered.  The ‘vexatious litigation’ 
argument currently being employed by the government to support derogation is 
then contextualised by means of a discussion of the Smith (No. 2) case.19  Ii is 
concluded that, inasmuch as the extra-territoriality of ECHR obligations during 
military deployments overseas is now widely acknowledged (if not universally 
accepted), the legal extension of human rights availability at all times has 
exacerbated existing frictions between law and politics, accelerated a wider 
debate as to rights coverage, exposed a disturbing normalising of rights 
downgrades, and carries real dangers for the future in terms of public 
accountability and the rule of law.20 
2. Derogation 
Derogation from the ECHR is permitted as per Article 15, which provides as 
follows:  
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating 
from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law.  
2. No derogation from Article 2 [the right to life], except in respect of 
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3 
[prohibition of torture and of unhuman or degrading treatment], 4(1) 
[prohibition of slavery or servitude], and 7 [prohibition of crimen sine 
lege], shall be made under this provision. 
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation 
shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully 
informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons 
therefor.  It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the 
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.21  
                                                          
19 (n 1). 
20 Consider, eg, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000), which came into force 
alongside the HRA 1998, and establishes the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.  In Regina (for 
Privacy International) v. I.P.T. [2017] EWHC 114, Leggatt J queried the consistency of RIPA s 
67(8) with the rule of law, as the Act originally afforded no right of appeal from the IPT. 
21 See ECHR Press Unit, ‘Factsheet:  Derogation in time of emergency’ (February 2017) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Derogation_ENG.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017.  See 
also JCHR (n 5) ‘Written evidence’, Council of Europe, Rapporteur on States of Emergency 
(Raphael Comte), ‘Written evidence to the JCHR:  proportionality issues concerning derogations 
under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (DRO0003’, 29 March 2017) 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
 
Member states are also allowed to derogate from the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, as per Article 4 of that instrument.22  
While neither the ECHR nor the ICCPR define specifically what is meant by a 
‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’,23 the following four 
requirements were developed and clarified in 1969 by the Council of Europe’s 
Commission on Human Rights:24  the emergency must be actual or imminent; 
its effects must involve the whole nation; the continuation of the community’s 
organised life must be threatened; and, the crisis or danger being experienced 
must be ‘exceptional’, that is to say, that ordinary measures or restrictions for 
maintaining public safety, health and good order are clearly inadequate.  
Further, the burden of proof in establishing that such a ‘public emergency’ 
exists is on the derogating state party.25   
 
As per Article 15(1), and taking Article 15(2) into account, any measures 
adopted must not be inconsistent with the derogating state’s other 
international law obligations; Article 15(3) implies that derogation must be 
‘temporary’, lasting no longer than absolutely necessary, as the consequences 
of derogation impact on individuals, who lose their full, ‘peacetime’ enjoyment 
of certain rights.  So far, so clear, but practice varies, and with many 
governments since 9/11 placing increasing emphasis on anticipating risks,26 
the traditional parameters (and duration) of state emergency derogation have 
become rather more ambiguous.  It is in this ‘anticipatory’ climate that the UK 
announced its ‘presumption to derogate’ in future, in October 2016.  
 
Council of Europe Member States which have derogated recently, albeit for 
domestic contexts alone, include Turkey and France,27 each having filed a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/government-proposed-echr-derogation-16-
17/publications/> accessed 22 May 2017. 
22 The UK is a party. 
23 A phrase first interpreted in 1961, in Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3) App no 332/57 (A/3) (ECtHR, 
1961). 
24 See the Greek Case, Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, Report of 
the Sub-Commission, Vol I Pt 1 (1969) < file:///C:/Users/Admin/AppData/Local/Temp/001-
73020.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017. 
25 ibid.  cf Raphael Comte (n 21). 
26 See, eg, J. McCulloch and S. Pickering, ‘Pre-crime and counter-terrorism:  imagining future 
crime in the “war on terror”’ [2009] 49(5) BrJCrim 628.  See also Council of Europe, Annual 
Activity Report 2016:  A critical turning point, not business as usual, for human rights in Europe 
(Strasbourg, 26 April 2017) <http://www.coe.int/fr/web/pristina/-/a-critical-turning-point-
not-business-as-usual-for-human-rights-in-europe> accessed 22 May 2017.  
27 As of the time of writing, Belgium has not derogated from the ECHR, despite three 
coordinated suicide bombings on 22 March 2016, two occurring at Brussels airport, and the 
third, at Maalbeek metro station.  The attacks have prompted Belgium, inter alia, to enact new 
counterterrorism laws and regulations, carry out raids, deploy more soldiers in major cities, 
etc.  Grounds for Concern, Summary, Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/11/03/grounds-concern/belgiums-counterterror-
responses-paris-and-brussels-attacks> accessed 22 May 2017. 
series of formal notices of derogation with the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe, after first declaring ‘states of emergency’.  France initially filed on 20 
November 2015,28 in response to terrorist attacks in Paris, on 13 November.  
As these terrorist atrocities have been followed by other terrorist incidents 
elsewhere in France, the government has extended and broadened its 
derogation, through to and beyond the country’s Presidential elections, which 
took place on 7 and 23 May 2017,29 and the French legislative elections, 
currently scheduled for 11 and 18 June. 
 
Turkey’s emergency derogation occurred after the country experienced a failed 
political coup attempt led by the state’s military on 15 July 2016,30 the 
aftermath of which caused serious domestic upheaval.  It followed France in 
declaring derogations on 21 July 2016,31 11 October 2016,32 and 3 January 
2017,33 which impacted on its human rights obligations;34 on 23 January 
                                                          
28 See, eg, Marko Milanovic, ‘France Derogates from ECHR in the Wake of the Paris Attacks’ 
(EJIL:  Talk!, 13 December 2015) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/france-derogates-from-echr-in-the-
wake-of-the-paris-attacks/> accessed 21 May 2017. 
29 Concerning subsequent derogation extensions on 19 February 2016, 20 May, 25 July and 19 
December, which presumably is still in force, as the Council of Europe has not notified Member 
States of its discontinuance, as of 25 May 2017.  See Council of Europe, France - Declaration 
related to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS 
No. 5, Notification - JJ8285C Tr./005-202 (Strasbourg, 22 December 2016) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2450299&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&B
ackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged=F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017.   
30 See, eg, Politics, ‘Council of Europe Secretary General:  Turkey has a right to “derogate” 
ECHR’, Daily Sabah (Ankara, 24 July 2016) 
<http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/07/24/council-of-europe-secretary-general-
turkey-has-a-right-to-derogate-echr> accessed 22 May 2017. 
31 Council of Europe, Turquie - Communication relative à la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits 
de l'Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales, STE n° 5, Notification - JJ8190C Tr./005-
192 (Strasbourg, 25 juillet 2016) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2436911&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&B
ackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged=F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017. 
32 Council of Europe, Turkey - Declaration related to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 5, Notification - JJ8239C Tr./005-
199 (Strasbourg, 18 October 2016) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=NotificationJJ8239C&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=o
riginal&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&BackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged
=F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017.  
33 Council of Europe, Turkey - Declaration related to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 5, Notification - JJ8289C Tr./005-203 
(Strasbourg, 6 January 2017) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=NotificationJJ8289C&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=or
iginal&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&BackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged=
F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017. 
34  After which tens of thousands of public employees, including military personnel, were 
sacked or suspended from their posts, and/or arrested.  See, eg, Zihni v. Turkey App no 
59061/16 (ECtHR 385, 8 December 2016):  claim dismissed, as ‘no special circumstances’ 
absolved the applicant’s non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, although the emergency 
measures did not permit appeal.  See Emre Turkut, ‘Has the European Court of Human Rights 
Turned a Blind Eye to Alleged Rights Abuses in Turkey?’ (EJIL:  Talk!, 28 December 2016)  
2017, it also communicated the establishment of a domestic Inquiry 
Commission on the State of Emergency Measures.35  Similar to France, Turkey 
has not specified precisely which ECHR articles it was derogating, although it 
did so for its ICCPR derogation,36 nor has it been explicit as to how the 
derogations would take effect.37  However, dissimilar to France, the Council of 
Europe Human Rights Commissioner on 15 February 2017 urged the Turkish 
government to lift the state of emergency.38  Therefore, it can be seen that, 
should the UK derogate, it would not be alone in the current climate in taking 
such a step.  As for derogation in relation specifically to military deployments, 
there is also some precedent, as Ukraine, in June 2015, similarly notified the 
Council of Europe of the Ukraine’s derogation in relation to its ongoing, border 
fighting with Russia,39 followed by further extensions registered at the Council 
of Europe on 5 November 2015,40 1 July 2016,41 and 3 February 2017.42   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/has-the-european-court-of-human-rights-turned-a-blind-eye-to-
alleged-rights-abuses-in-turkey/> accessed 21 May 2017.  See generally Council of Europe 
(Venice Commission), Opinion No. 865/2016, on Emergency Decree Laws Nos. 667 – 676 
Adopted Following the Failed Coup of 15 July 2016, CDL-AD(2016)037, 9 – 10 (Strasbourg, 
December 2015) <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2016)037-e> accessed 22 May 2017. 
35 Council of Europe, Turkey - Declaration related to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 5, Notification - JJ8311C Tr./005-204 
(Strasbourg, 31 January 2017) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2452623&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&B
ackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged=F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017. 
36 Stating ‘In this process, measures taken may involve derogation from obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding Articles 2/3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 
17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27, as permissible in Article 4 of the said Covenant’.  UN, Turkey:  
Notification under Article 4(3), Depositary Notification C.N.580.2016.TREATIES-IV.4 (New York, 
21 July 2016) <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.580.2016-Eng.pdf> 
accessed 22 May 2017. 
37 Instead, stating that emergency measures ‘may’ result.  See, eg, Martin Scheinin, ‘Turkey’s 
Derogation from Human Rights Treaties – an Update’ (EJIL:  Talk!, 18 August 2016)  
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/turkeys-derogation-from-human-rights-treaties-an-update/> 
accessed 21 May 2017. 
38 Council of Europe, Commission for Human Rights, Urgent measures are needed to restore 
freedom of expression in Turkey (Strasbourg, 15 February 2017) 
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/urgent-measures-are-needed-to-restore-
freedom-of-expression-in-turkey> accessed 22 Ma 2017.  In response, see Observations by the 
Turkish authorities on the Commissioner's Memorandum on freedom of expression and media 
freedom in Turkey, CommDH/GovRep(2017)2 (Strasbourg, 15 Feb 2017) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CommDH/GovRep(2017)2&Language=lanEnglish&
direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017.  See also Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights (Nils Muižnieks), Memorandum on freedom of expression and media freedom in Turkey, 
CommDH(2017)5/ (Strasbourg, 15 Feb. 2017) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CommDH(2017)5&Language=lanAll&direct=true> 
accessed 22 May 2017; Emre Turkut (n 34).  See also Annual Activity Report 2016 (n 26), in 
which the Council of Europe criticises the recent tendency of derogating Member States to 
effect a ‘quasi-automatic prolongation of states of emergency and derogations from the 
Convention’, ostensibly to fight terrorism. 
39 Council of Europe, ‘News:  Ukraine derogation from European Convention on Human Rights’, 
(Strasbourg, 10 June 2016) <http://www.coe.int/en/web/secretary-general/news/-
 
Otherwise, the Council of Europe website notes that eight ECHR state parties 
have derogated in the past,43 including the UK.  The UK is also among four 
ECHR state parties which have been required by the ECtHR to justify their 
derogation measures.44  As ECHR derogation is not entirely an 
unchallengeable, sovereign act, it might be thought the UK might exercise due 
caution to ensure it fulfilled the necessary conditions prior to declaring an 
emergency and seeking to derogate from the ECHR.  Instead, it appears the UK 
has chosen to pre-empt concrete ‘events’, and announce its ‘presumption to 
derogate’ in future, in advance, which is highly unusual, if not deeply odd, as 
the government appears ‘anticipatorily’ to be doing what any ECHR (and 
ICCPR) state party has the flexibility to do, but only in response to a ‘public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation’, and regarding which derogation is 
factually both ‘absolutely necessary’ and ‘proportionate’.45   
 
3. The ‘Presumption to Derogate’ 
 
It is worth reiterating that the issue of derogation arises in a context of recent, 
human rights protections for British military personnel deployed overseas.  
Prior to Smith (No. 2),46 UK common law imposed no special duty of care on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
/asset_publisher/EYlBJNjXtA5U/content/ukraine-derogation-from-european-convention-on-
human-
rights/16695?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Ffr%2Fweb%2Fs
ecretary-
general%2Fnews%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_EYlBJNjXtA5U%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_
state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-4%26p_p_col_count%3D1> 
accessed 22 May 2017.   
40 Council of Europe, Ukraine - Declaration related to the Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 005, Notification - JJ8034C Tr./005-186 
(Strasbourg, 5 November 2015) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2380047&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&B
ackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged=F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017. 
41 Council of Europe, Ukraine – Declaration related to the Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 005, Notification – JJ8172C Tr./005-190 
(Strasbourg, 1 July 2016) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2435663&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&B
ackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged=F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017. 
42 Council of Europe, Ukraine – Declaration related to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 5, Notification – JJ8318C Tr./005-205 
(Strasbourg, 3 February 2017) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2452899&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=F7F8FB&B
ackColorIntranet=F7F8FB&BackColorLogged=F7F8FB&direct=true> accessed 22 May 2017 . 
43 Albania, Armenia, France, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
‘Factsheet’ (n 21) 2. 
44 ibid, for a brief overview of the cases in which the four states parties were asked to justify 
derogation measures. 
45 See, eg, Raphael Comte (n 21). 
46 (n 1). 
government (in tort or otherwise) to protect its military personnel.47  The MOD 
is subject to ordinary employment duties to provide a safe system of work, 
including supervision, training, equipment, competent colleagues, and so on, 
such duties have not been extended traditionally to personnel when engaged 
with the enemy, and the MOD is also exempt from criminal prosecution in such 
circumstances.48  On the other hand, as the armed forces fall within the 
definition of a public authority, they are expected to comply with national and 
international law, including human rights law.49  Obviously, there are ‘different 
moral valences in human rights law and the laws of war – the key difference 
being the role of military necessity in the latter’,50 yet a long-standing, tacit 
recognition, that the nature of military service and the use of armed force entail 
restrictions on the civilian rights of service personnel endures, such that, until 
recently, any ‘entitlement’ to human rights or other special protections for 
service personnel, most notably their right to life, has had to await case law, 
judicial activism, and a high number of military-related damages actions 
against the UK Government,51 whether brought by British military personnel, 
by those they have detained and/or imprisoned, and/or by their families.  
  
                                                          
47 A situation somewhat altered by s 7 HRA, and since influenced by Osman v. UK 23452/94 
(2009) 29 EHRR 245. 
48 Nonetheless, the Health and Safety Executive can issue Crown enforcement notices and 
issue a Crown censure in lieu of criminal proceedings.  Anthony Forster, ‘British judicial 
engagement and the juridification of the armed forces’ [2012] 88(2) International Affairs 283, 
291 n. 41, citing, inter alia, Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] EWCA Civ 1323; Multiple 
Claimants v. MOD [2003] EWHC 1334; MOD v. Radclyffe [2009] EWCA Civ. 635. 
49 ibid 286, citing Richard Ball (citation omitted).  See also Geir Ulfstein, Interpretation of the 
ECHR in the Light of Other International Instruments, PluriCourts Research Paper No. 15-05 
(June 17, 2015) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619592> accessed 
22 May 2017.  
50 Miles Jackson, ‘The Fog of Law’ (EJIL:  Talk!, 21 April 2015) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
fog-of-law/> accessed 21 May 2017.  See also Tomuschat (n 4) (absence of remedies in IHL 
necessitates the intervention of the ECtHR). 
51 See, eg, Monica Feria-Tinta, ‘Extra-Territorial Claims in the “Spider’s Web” of the Law?  UK 
Supreme Court Judgment in Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians’ (EJIL:  Talk!, 25 May 2016)  
<www.ejiltalk.org/extra-territorial-claims-in-the-spider’s-web-of-the-law?-uk-supreme-court-
judgment-in-ministry-of-defence-v-iraqi-civilians/> accessed 21 May 2017 (14 lead claimants, 
in claims by over 600 Iraqi citizens, alleging unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment 
at the hands of British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009).  But see Peter Walker, 
‘Iraq war claims unit to be shut down, says UK defence minister’, The Guardian (London, 10 
February 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/iraq-war-claims-unit-to-
be-shut-down-says-uk-defence-secretary> accessed 21 May 2017; Owen Bowcott, ‘Phil Shiner:  
steep fall from grace for leading human rights lawyer’, The Guardian (London, 2 February 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/feb/02/phil-shiner-steep-fall-from-grace-leading-
uk-human-rights-lawyer-iraq> accessed 21 May 2017; Robert Mendick, ‘Top lawyer facing 
criminal enquiry over “bribes” paid to Iraqis over abuse claims against British troops’, The 
Telegraph (London, 3 August 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/03/top-
lawyer-facing-criminal-inquiry-over-bribes-paid-to-iraqis-br/> accessed 21 May 2017 
(claims Iraqi civilians were bribed to bring abuse claims against British soldiers; bribes 
allegedly disguised as publicly-funded legal aid expenses).  
Such litigation in turn has required the ECtHR and the English courts to 
grapple with applying the ECHR extra-territorially in military environments.  
While this litigation has been highly contentious, of particular concern are the 
UK government’s stated rationales for its future ‘presumption to derogate’, 
which rests in part on a basis other than a ‘public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation’.  Specifically, the government emphasises that a ‘presumption 
of derogation’ in future would be intended to ‘protect British troops serving in 
future conflicts’ from what the government terms an ‘industry of vexatious’ and 
‘persistent legal claims’, costing millions of pounds, and thusly, to avoid 
‘undermin[ing] the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces.52  The 
financial nature of these rationales makes doubly-mystifying the qualifying 
phrase ‘if possible in the circumstances that exist at that time’, other than, 
perhaps, implying the possibility of an adverse ECtHR opinion or two, and one 
wonders what the government has in mind in terms of the ‘impossible’.  Be that 
as it may, by indicating officially that the government ‘may’ derogate during 
future military deployments abroad, the government begins to normalise the 
derogation process within a ‘patriotic’ (rather than strictly ‘defensive’) context, 
which risks entrenching ‘temporary’ emergency security laws, diluting the rule 
of law, and conditioning the public at large to expect less in general from 
governmental duties of care. 
 
The gravity of these and related dangers led the UK Parliament’s Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) to respond rapidly by letter to the Defence 
Secretary’s October 2016 announcement.  In it, the JCHR posed a series of 
probing questions, and a separate request for specific data and detail as to the 
alleged ‘vexatious’ and ‘persistent legal claims’ on which a future ‘presumption 
to derogate’ might be based.53  The government was requested to quantify its 
claims of ‘vexatiousness’, to provide actual numbers of claims which have been 
brought, settled, determined and/or dismissed by a court, and to account for 
the actual amounts paid in legal aid and compensation resulting from the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The JCHR targeted most of its 25 questions in the 
letter’s Annex at the specific requirements of Article 15 ECHR, eg, the 
exigencies of ‘war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, 
and the requirement that derogation must be ‘strictly required’ by these 
exigencies, and consistent with other international obligations.  The JCHR 
reminded the Defence Secretary that, as per Article 15(2), some rights cannot 
be derogated, and the JCHR inquired specifically regarding the total number of 
claims brought under non-derogable Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, as well as under 
Article 5 (the right to liberty), which latter has an exhaustive list of possible 
                                                          
52 News story (n 6).   
53 JCHR, Letter: The Government’s Proposed Derogation from the ECHR, 13 October 2016, 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/correspondence/2016-17/Letter-to-Defence-Secretary-re-proposed-derogation-from-
ECHR-131016.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017. 
exceptions.54  Additional questions concerned whether adequate judicial and 
Parliamentary scrutiny of a ‘presumption to derogate’ in future would be 
available, and the likely implications of derogation on the wider European 
system of rights enforcement.55    
 
The Defence Secretary, in his initial response on 22 November, avoided 
answering many of the JCHR’s questions, stating only that they could not yet 
be answered ‘because the Government has only announced an intention to 
derogate, not an actual derogation’.56  Consequently, the government was 
reluctant to engage in hypothetical debate in advance of a relevant situation 
arising.  The response of 22 November also acknowledged that a future 
derogation would need justification ‘in the precise circumstances of the 
particular military operation in question’,57 and, therefore, that the government 
was only indicating its desire in future to secure sufficient flexibility.  In the 
JCHR’s response to this letter, on 16 December, the JCHR Chair reminded the 
government that  
The last time the UK derogated from the ECHR, in the wake of 9/11, the 
derogation received little parliamentary scrutiny and was later found to 
be incompatible with the ECHR by both the UK’s highest court and the 
European Court of Human Rights.58  This time, the Government’s case 
for intending to derogate rests on a number of assertions which need to 
be rigorously tested.59 
The JCHR also opened-up the discussion to the public, inviting their written 
submissions by 31 March 2017, extended to 7 April, in order for Parliament to 
hear and understand the public’s views and any concerns there may be 
regarding the government’s announced intention.  However, the Committee has 
now closed this inquiry due to the snap calling of a General Election on 8 June 
                                                          
54 See, eg, Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 of the 
Convention:  Right to Liberty and Security (Strasbourg, 2014) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_5_ENG.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017.   
55 A response by 4 November was requested.  JCHR, Letter (n 53). 
56 Parliamentary Business, JCHR, Enquiry Background:  ECHR:  Committee launches inquiry 
into Government’s proposed derogation, 16 December 2016  
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/news-parliament-2015/echr-derogation-launch-16-17/> accessed 21 May 2017. 
57 ibid.  
58 A reference to A and Others v. the UK Appln no 3455/05 (Grand Chamber, 19 February 
2009) <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-2638619-
2883392%22]}> accessed 22 May 2017, in which the UK Supreme Court had previously 
deemed detention without trial only of foreign terrorist suspects to be discriminatory.  cf Owen 
Boycott, ‘Thatcher gave way on dropping powers to detain terrorists, files show’, The Guardian 
(London, 30 December 2016)     
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/30/margaret-thatcher-gave-way-on-
dropping-terrorist-detention-powers-northern-ireland> accessed 21 May 2017.  
59 JCHR Enquiry Background (n 56). 
2017, which necessitated the dissolution of Parliament on 3 May 2017, at 
which point all current Select Committees ceased to exist60  Otherwise, the 
most recent response to the JCHR from the Defence Secretary was dated 28 
February 2017, and published by the JCHR on 1 March 2017, and as the 
current JCHR has indicated, at the time of writing, that ‘if an inquiry on this 
subject is held in the future, the Committee may refer to the evidence already 
gathered as part of this inquiry’,61 the details of the Defence Secretary’s most 
recent correspondence are now briefly summarised. 
4. The Government Memorandum 
The Defence Secretary’s response to the JCHR of 28 February confirms ‘that no 
decision has been taken as to whether in the context of any particular future 
military operation it would or would not be appropriate to derogate’, and that 
‘everything possible will be done to facilitate early Parliamentary scrutiny if and 
when we decide to derogate’.62  It notes with approval that the UK Supreme 
Court acknowledges the ‘analytic and practical difficulties’ of extending the 
jurisdiction of the ECHR ‘into realms for which it was not designed’, and he 
reiterates that it is not yet ‘possible to provide sufficient detail to allow 
meaningful scrutiny now of the likely justification of future decisions’.63  
Nonetheless, accompanying this brief response is a short ‘Government 
Memorandum’, in which the government seeks to justify more completely a 
future derogation.  Via sections entitled ‘Policy Rationale’, ‘Legislation’, 
‘Conditions for Derogation’, ‘Operational Effectiveness and NATO’, ‘Legal 
Claims’, and ‘Compensation’, the Memorandum concludes that, although the 
UK Supreme Court has modified its approach, and begun to modify human 
rights in operational environments, to which IHL must apply,64 it was less clear 
                                                          
60 At the time of writing, the Enquiry is now terminated, due to the snap General Election 
scheduled for 8 June 2017.  Parliamentary Business, JCHR, Enquiry status:  concluded, 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/government-proposed-echr-derogation-16-
17/publications/> accessed 21 May 2017.  See also Ed Bates, ‘Extra-territorial derogations 
from the ECHR for future armed conflicts involving the UK?’, ukstrasbourgspotlight, 31 March 
2017 <https://ukstrasbourgspotlight.wordpress.com/2017/03/31/extra-territorial-
derogations-from-the-echr-for-future-armed-conflicts-involving-the-uk/> accessed 22 May 
2017 (written submission to the JCHR, but not yet published as of 15 April). 
61 Enquiry status (n 60); Secretary of State for Defence, Letter to the Chair of the JCHR, 28 
February 2017 <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/correspondence/2016-17/170301_SoS_to_Chair_re_Derogation.pdf> accessed 22 May 
2017. 
62 Letter (n 61), annexed Government Memorandum [2] and [4], respectively.  
63 ibid [3] and [4], respectively.  
64 The Defence Secretary considers such cases as the following to be ‘helpful’:  Mohammed & 
Ors v MOD [2017] UKSC 1 & [2017] UKSC 2; and, joined appeals in Serdar Mohammed & Al-
Waheed v. MOD [2017] UKSC 2; both concerned UN-mandated peacekeeping operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  In Mohammed & Ors, the Court agreed the government was not liable in tort 
for wrongful detention or treatment; the acts in question had been Crown acts of state, taken 
whether the ECtHR would always be similarly inclined.  Hence, a ‘presumption 
to derogate’ in future operations would be warranted, to fill a perceived need for 
‘a clear legal framework’ in such situations,65 i.e., IHL alone would be 
applicable in such situations. 
The Memorandum admits that the UK would be the first ECHR state party to 
derogate in respect of its overseas activities.66  Whilst maintaining that the case 
for derogating is ‘obvious’, the Memorandum also constitutes the first time the 
government has publicly provided somewhat more detailed reasons for its 
allegations that extending ECHR extra-territoriality to military deployments 
overseas had adverse impacts.  Moreover, while ‘the UK’s position has always 
been that IHL regulates armed conflict’,67 in order to use lethal force, and 
detain lawfully, the ECtHR’s own guidance in relation to the meaning of ‘war’ is 
cited with approval:  ‘any substantial violence or unrest short of war likely to 
fall within the scope of the second limb of article 15(1), “a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation”’.68  The section entitled ‘Operational 
Effectiveness and NATO’ concentrates on the former, as not all NATO countries 
are party to the ECHR.69   
The Memorandum highlights that practical difficulties are encountered with 
human rights in operational environments, including potential negative effects 
on the morale, fighting power and operational effectiveness of military 
personnel, and the risk of military witnesses relapsing with PTSD and other 
psychological difficulties during ECHR Article 2-compliant investigations.70   
However, the sections entitled ‘Legal Claims’ and ‘Compensation’ form by far 
the bulk of the Memorandum.  Pointing to the Conservative Party 2015 election 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
during foreign military operations.  In Waheed, the Court approved the detention of prisoners 
for periods exceeding 96 hours when necessary for imperative security reasons, as implicitly 
authorised by UN Security Council resolutions; ECHR Article 5 could ‘accommodate’ this, but 
procedures must comply with Article 5(4).  See, eg, Shaheed Fatima, QC, ‘UK Supreme Court 
Judgment on Extra-Territorial Detention in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Just Security, 17 January 
2017) <https://www.justsecurity.org/36407/uk-supreme-court-judgment-extra-territorial-
detention-iraq-afghanistan/> accessed 22 May 2017. 
65 Government Memorandum (n 62) [17]. 
66 ibid [3]. 
67 ibid [4].  Contrast Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (1996) 
ICJ Rep 1996, 22 (human rights protections do not cease during armed conflict); Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) (2004) ICJ Rep, 136 (the facts determine whether some rights arise under IHL, human 
rights, or both legal regimes).  Consider also Bankovic (n 7) (‘piecemeal’ applicability of the 
ECHR, if relevant).  Government Memorandum (n 62) [6], entitled ‘Legislation’, notes mainly 
that any derogation order would be subject to Parliamentary debate and approval. 
68 Government Memorandum (n 62) [8].  [6] cites the ‘ECtHR Guide on Article 15 of the ECHR’. 
69 ibid [10].  
70 ibid [9].  See, eg, R (on the application of Smith) (Respondent) v SOS for Defence (Appellant) 
and another [2010] UKSC 29 (inquests must satisfy ECHR Article 2 procedures). 
manifesto and a Written Ministerial Statement of 10 October 2016, the 
government’s commitment to prevent ‘persistent’ human rights during overseas 
military operations is maintained,71 but the Memorandum defends the 
government’s position.  It asserts that, of some ‘1400 judicial review 
applications against the Ministry of Defence relating to the Iraq conflict’, ‘only a 
tiny minority’ of the compensation claims ‘have been accompanied by full 
documentation’.72  The absence of evidence that has plagued many of the 
claims brought under common law is highlighted, and it is asserted ‘that a 
number of claimants had changed their stories halfway through their cases’.73   
As for government pay-outs to litigants, it is tersely noted that ‘the Ministry of 
Defence has settled over 300 wrongful detention claims on a tariff basis, 
according to length of detention’ – a policy decision made after the ECtHR 
judgment in Al Jedda v United Kingdom,74 in which the Court found no lawful 
authority to detain Iraqi civilians during non-international phases of UK 
operations in Iraq:  lawful detention required prior UN Security Council 
authorisation, which had not occurred.  Subsequently, however, the Court, in 
Hassan v United Kingdom,75 had in fact qualified this stance:  the safeguards of 
IHL and the ECHR during armed conflicts co-exist, but issues surrounding 
prisoners of war and detainees must be determined by IHL in line with the 
security risks.  This judicial change-of-heart leads the Memorandum to state 
that ‘[i]t is therefore inaccurate to characterise the settlement of those claims 
as an acceptance of wrongdoing on the part of the UK’.76   
The Memorandum concludes that a clear legal framework is needed for 
operational and strategic decision-making, thus implying that the ‘presumption 
to derogate’ is aimed squarely at a future intention to make IHL, alone, the 
legal framework applied to overseas military deployments.77  Overall, this 
response to the JCHR may placate those critical of the high financial costs and 
compensatory damages incurred during recent overseas deployments.78  In 
                                                          
71 Government Memorandum (n 62) [14]. 
72 ibid [11].  [12] refers to the ‘now-defunct Public Interest Lawyers’. 
73 ibid [16] n 6, citing R (Al-Saadoon & ors. n 9), regarding altered testimonies. 
74 ibid (62) [15 n 8] citing (2011) 53 EHRR 23.  See also (n 11).  cf Nick Cohen, ‘Nobody, not 
even British soldiers, should be above the law’, The Guardian (London, 23 January 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/23/british-soldiers-should-not-be-
above-law> accessed 22 May 2017 (mistreatment of 1,514 Iraqis alleged, including 280 who 
died; MOD has paid out £20m in 326 cases without admitting liability). 
75 Government Memorandum (n 62) [16 n 9] citing (2014) 38 BHRC 358. 
76 ibid [16]. 
77 ibid [17]. 
78 See, eg, See Tom Tugendhat and Laura Croft, Policy Exchange:  The Fog of Law:  An 
introduction to the legal erosion of British fighting power, Appendix C (Policy Exchange, 18 
October 2013) < https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/the-fog-of-
law.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017, and, its follow-up, Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan and Tom 
Tugendhat, Clearing the Fog of Law:  Saving our armed forces from defeat by judicial diktat 
contrast, the case of Smith v. MOD (No. 2) [2013],79 concerning the Article 2 
‘right to life’ of serving military personnel seems particularly apposite to 
illustrate the ground-breaking nature of ECtHR extra-territoriality, as the 
Supreme Court acknowledged and reinforced for domestic law purposes.80  
Most crucially, the Supreme Court recognised that, when the time arrives to 
assess whether the government owes duties of care to all those under its power 
and control, the same considerations apply to claims brought under ECHR 
Article 2 as to common law tort claims, including for its serving military 
personnel.81 
5. Smith v. UK (No. 2) [2013]  
The issue of a future ECHR derogation, designed to pre-empt human rights in 
favour of IHL during active military deployments overseas, runs counter both to 
‘teleological’ Strasbourg case law on extra-territoriality,82 and to notions of 
human rights ‘universality’.  In turn, the influence of the Strasbourg law 
prompted the UK Supreme Court majority decision in Smith v. UK (No. 2),83 and 
foreshadows the recent and highly-critical Iraq Inquiry Report, which notes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Policy Exchange, 2015), < https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/clearing-the-fog-of-law.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017.  Additional 
publications and links from the Policy Exchange on the topic may be found at 
<http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/component/search/?searchword=fog%20of%20law&searc
hphrase=exact&limit=20> accessed 22 May 2017.  See also the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which, while not applicable to the battlefield, has ‘caused 
anxiety in the MOD’, by allowing juries ‘to consider the attitudes, policies, systems and 
accepted practices within the organisation.  Forster (n 48) 291 (citations omitted). 
79 In Smith (No. 2) (n 1), the UK Supreme Court took extensive account of the long line of 
Strasbourg case law which has culminated in the extra-territorial reach of the ECHR.  
80 The course of which caused much legal commentary.  See, eg, Case Comment, Slapper, ‘The 
right to life on the battlefield’ [2010] 74(5) JCrimL 383; Case Comment, ‘Right to life - 
jurisdiction - British troops dying or being injured whilst on active military service in Iraq’ 
[2011] 109(Jul) Human Rights Updater 6; P. Ronchi, ‘The borders of human rights’ [2012] 
128(Jan.) LQR 20; Case Comment, ‘Claims involving Armed Forces: duty of care owed by 
Ministry of Defence’ [Dec/Jan 2012-13] PI Comp 10; Case Comment, Jonathan Morgan, 
‘Negligence: into battle’ [2013] 72(1) Cambr LJ 14; Case Comment, ‘Tort: Smith v Ministry of 
Defence [2012] EWCA Civ 1365, [2013] 2 WLR 27 (CA (Civ Div))’ [2013] Public Law 171; Case 
Comment, Mullender, ‘Military operations, fairness and the British state’ [2014] 130(Jan) LQR 
28.   
81 Until Smith (No. 2) (n 1), nothing in domestic jurisprudence ‘suggest[ed] that in parallel with 
the statutory cause of action’, common law claims for breaches of human rights have also 
developed.  Brice Dickson, ‘If the Human Rights Act were repealed, could the common law fill 
the void?, Oxford Human Rights Hub, 27 November 2013 <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/if-the-
human-rights-act-were-repealed-could-the-common-law-fill-the-void/> accessed 22 |May 
2017. 
82 Including, inter alia, Bankovic (n 7).     
83 Due, as per R (on the application of Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, [2004] 2 AC 
323 [20], Bingham L, to the duty of the national court ‘to keep pace with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as it evolves over time, no more, but certainly no less’.  See Paula Giliker, ‘The 
Influence of EU and European Human Rights Law on English Private Law’ [2015] 64(2) ICLQ 
237 s IV(C). 
both that the consequences of the 2003 invasion and subsequent military 
occupation of Iraq are still being felt,84 and that many serving British personnel 
still experience service-related problems.85  Regardless, the evolution of extra-
territoriality has been hotly contested throughout,86 and consequently 
prompted a number of ‘accommodations’ to be made by the ECtHR in order to 
adjust the IHL-ECHR balance,87 such that one could suppose that extra-
territoriality might be viewed more favourably.     
Be that as it may, in Smith (No. 2), breach of the government’s duties of care 
under tort negligence and Article 2 ECHR were alleged, due to inadequate 
military training and/or equipment.  The claims arose out of the deaths of 
three soldiers and the injuries of another two, while serving in the British Army 
in Iraq between 2003 and 2006.88  The Court was asked to deal mainly with 
three issues:  whether two of the deaths (inadequate equipment) were within 
ECHR Article 1 jurisdiction, whether the UK owed Article 2 ‘positive’ duties to 
all the deceased soldiers, and whether the doctrine of combat immunity 
constituted a defence to the negligence claims (inadequate equipment, 
technology and training).  A majority in the Supreme Court allowed the 
separate claims in tort and Article 2 ECHR,89 and narrowly construed the 
defence of combat immunity to cover only active military operations or action 
immediately preceding combat,90 and thus denying the MOD’s contention that 
the doctrine should be extended to cover both training and equipment 
procurement.  The Court considered this would be excessive, as pre-theatre 
training and equipment procurement decisions can occur far in advance of 
operations.91   
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A 4 - 3 majority emphasised that the same considerations applied for both the 
tort negligence and ECHR claims, and established for the first time in British 
law that military personnel deployed on active overseas operations could sue 
the government under both standards of duties of care.  This it did cautiously, 
however, exempting ‘high level’ decisions and the actual conduct of operations 
from review,92 and cautioning that all such matters would need further 
investigation as to their surrounding facts and evidence.93  Even so, a ‘middle 
ground’ remained, albeit one carrying a wide margin of appreciation, ‘where it 
would be reasonable to expect the individual to be afforded the protection of 
the article’.94  Seemingly anticipating the reasons for the current government’s 
proposal of a future ‘presumption to derogate’, the Court warned that this 
‘middle ground’ should not be utilised to impede the work of the military, or to 
provoke, through the threat of litigation,95 a ‘defensive approach’ to strategic 
and procurement issues or to tactical and combat stages when equipment is 
being deployed.  It also cautioned against imposing ‘unrealistic or excessively 
burdensome’ standards on military commanders.96   
In contrast, the minority did not wish to extend the duties either of Article 2 
ECHR or of common law negligence into what they argued was a new field.97  
Moreover, human rights and tort negligence should remain quite separate in 
British law, rather than converge.  Indeed, a preference was noted for deciding 
the case entirely in tort negligence, with its familiar parameters of practical 
‘reasonableness’.  Therefore, the minority would have rejected the Article 2 
claims because of the political nature of military matters, including training 
and equipment procurement decisions, which require the (political) allocation of 
available resources.  Arguing that Article 2 ECHR should be engaged, if at all, 
only for systematic, not operational failures,98 it was made clear that Article 2 
ECHR should not be extended to errors in the chain of command or relate to 
the conduct of operations.  It was also ‘unclear how far the two substantive 
[framework and operational] duties are separated, with middle ground between 
them, or, form part of a continuum covering almost every aspect of state 
activity’.99   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
adopted on 24 July 2013, COM(2013)0542, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0542> accessed 22 May 2017.  See also Martin 
Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive:  limitation, 
flexibility, descriptiveness, and substitution’ [2013] EL Rev 3. 
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In summary, Smith (No. 2) well-illustrates how polarised the arguments become 
when there is a choice between legal frameworks when states employ military 
force.  The gradual erosion of Crown and combat immunities, of political 
control over when and where to deploy the military, of military control over 
training, and of political and military control over equipment procurement and 
operational planning, all collided in the case.  The breakthrough of more 
extensive duties of care to military personnel deployed overseas on active 
service, and the recognition that a ‘middle ground’ exists in which they may 
bring litigation,100 encourages not only greater public and judicial scrutiny of 
military deployments in general, but also necessitates more official caution in 
particular, as already promoted by numerous EU directives and other 
measures101 intended to increase transparency and avoid both protectionism 
and possible corruption.102  
The former ‘fixed points’ of reference of military life, as noted by Forster,103 
which once ensured ‘the hierarchical and impenetrable nature of the armed 
forces’,104 have long been due for modernisation, while the ‘golden shield’ of 
military immunity has vanished.105  In their place is the rule of law, already 
‘accommodating’ the ECHR to the battlefield necessities reflected in IHL.  On 
this basis, normalising military derogations in future would not assist in 
desired ‘clarity’.106  On the contrary, the government’s response, via its 
proposed ‘presumption to derogate’ in future, appears designed mainly to 
prevent greater public, departmental and/or judicial scrutiny over the 
government’s deployments of armed force,107 and with it, to block individual 
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personnel, and so on, even though (or because) such forms of redress are vital 
in deterring impunity, malpractice and gross negligence.109   
The many controversies surrounding recent deployments of British service 
personnel abroad, particularly in non-self-defence contexts or ‘wars of 
choice’,110 along with the availability of litigation, demands for public enquiries 
and so on, which publicise the symptoms and causes of public disquiet, and 
which place greater pressure on politicians to pause longer when deciding to 
utilise the military instrument, have all proven crucial to the health and 
maintenance of vibrant British democratic institutions.111  Therefore, and in 
view of the fact that there is as yet no guarantee that the UK will remain a 
Member State of the ECHR in future,112 the alternative realities, had cases 
such as Smith (No. 2), and public inquiries such as Chilcot113 or Al-Sweady,114 
and, indeed, the Deepcut Review,115 not occurred, do not bear close scrutiny.  
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6. Conclusion 
This brief discussion considered the current, Conservative Party-led 
government’s stated intention in October 2016 to derogate from the ECHR 
during future military deployments overseas.  The government has sought to 
justify this on the need for greater legal ‘clarity’ during such deployments.  
However, this stated purpose is partly rationalised by a desire to reduce the 
costs of rights litigation which arise during military operations overseas, so 
must be queried on many levels.  Further, safeguarding the human rights of all 
by erasing the rights of some is fundamentally counter-intuitive:  human rights 
form a protective shield for everyone, rather than just for some, against 
government abuse.  When the government states it is seeking to avoid the 
‘vexatious’ litigation of recent military deployments, it disregards the fact that 
some litigation has also been brought for the arbitrary and/or negligently-
inflicted death or injury of British military personnel themselves, as well as for 
the alleged, unlawful detention and/or imprisonment of others.  If the 
government resents having settled ‘hundreds’ of claims for wrongful detention, 
etc., it surely is worth remembering the conditions which led to that litigation 
in the first place.  Finally, it is difficult to understand why the armed forces - a 
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public authority – should not be expected to comply with national and 
international law, including human rights law, to the extent to which they are 
able.   
The case of Smith (No. 2) well-illustrates these points, and underscores how 
and why the slow erosions of Crown and combat immunities, and of political 
and military control over when, where and how to use the military instrument, 
have long been overdue.  The ‘middle ground’ left, albeit cautiously, by the UK 
Supreme Court for potential litigation in future is thus a salutary reminder of 
the virtuous – and necessary - clash of interests at stake.  Public and judicial 
scrutiny of military decision-making, the ability to seek and obtain legal 
redress, and so on, must be maintained in a society where due care and regard 
are paid by those in power to the populations they purport to represent, 
regulate and protect.  If not, a ‘presumption to derogate’ in future can only be 
viewed as a measure to normalise fewer rights, and to condition the public to 
expect less, never more, from those to whom their security and well-being are 
entrusted. 
 
 
